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Fisher: OSHA Standards

THE DEMISE OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS IN OSHA STANDARDS:
AMERICAN TEXTILE
MANUFACTURERS INSTITUTE v.
DONOVAN
I. INTRODUCTION

In American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, l
the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (the Agency or
OSHA), in promulgating standards regulating worker exposure
to toxic or harmful substances pursuant to section 655(b) of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act),1 is resolved to first conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The Court reserved the issue by determining that "cost benefit analysis by
OSHA is not required by the statute because a feasibility analysis is."1
During the prior term, the Court had deftly avoided the
question of cost-benefit analysis while deciding Industrial
Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute. 4 In American Petroleum, a plurality of the Court upheld a
Fifth Circuit decision which struck down the benzene regulation
because the Agency had not shown that the standard was "reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe or healthful
employment."11 Having disposed of the case on the ground that
the Secretary failed to make a finding of a significant health
risk, the Court did not have to address the further question of
whether the Fifth Circuit was correct in requiring a reasonable
correlation between costs and health and benefits. The plurality
opinion in American Petroleum seemed to hint, however, that in
1. 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981).
2. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976».
3. 101 S. Ct. at 2490.
4. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
5. ld. at 613 (quoting American Petroleum lnat. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1978».
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the future the Court would require cost-benefit analysis in the
regulation of toxic substances under Section 655(b).8
The purpose of a cost-benefit analysis' is to aid decisionmakers in allocating scarce societal resources in the most
beneficial manner. Theoretically, the cost-benefit analysis is simple: Each expected cost and benefit associated with a given activity is identified and valued in an equivalent unit, usually dollars, to aid in quantification. 8 All expected costs and benefits are
then added separately, and whichever side attains the highest
value prevails. Presumably, cost-benefit analysis provides a scientific basis upon which to make decisions.'
The use of the cost-benefit analysis in the areas of health
and safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection,
where human life is at stake however, is fraught with fundamental problems and limitations. Answering the basic questions of
how costs and benefits should be identified,lo what values should
6. See 448 U.S. at 639·40 (Stevena, J.) (reading §§ 655(b)(5) and 652(8) together to
force the Agency to find a significant risk of harm to worker health at present levels of
exposure, before new regulations are promulgated). Once a significant risk of harm is
quantified, a value can be assigned and it is but a short step to fun cost·benefit analysis.
See notes 7·13 infra and accompanying text. E.g., Justice Powen in his concurrence in
American Petroleum would read cost·benefit analysis into the Act. See 448 U.S. at 664,
667·71.
7. As used in this Note the term cost·benefit analysis meane "the weighing of the
costs of complying with the regulation againat the health and safety benefits that will
result." Note, Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: I.
Cost·Benefit Analysis Required?, 49 FORDHAM L. RBv. 432, 435·36 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Is Cost·Benefit Analysis Required). For more indepth discU88ions of the benefits
and detriments of cost·benefit analysis ,ee generally Baram, COlt· Benefit Analysis: An
Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8
EcOLOGY L.Q. 473 (1980); Green, Cost·Risk·Benefit Assessment and the Law: Introduction and Perspective, 45 Gso. WASH. L. RBv. 901 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Green,
Cost·Risk·Benefit Assessment); Green, The Risk·Benefit CalculUl in Safety Determina·
tions, 43 Gso. WASH. L. RBv. 791 (1975) [hereinafter cited 88 Green, Risk·Benefit
Calculus); Handler, A Rebuttal: The Need for a Sufficient Scientific Base for Govern·
ment Regulation, 43 Gso. WASH. L. REv. 808 (1975); Kasper, C08t·Benefit Analysis in
Environmental Decision·Making, 45 GBO. WASH. L. RBV. 1013 (1977); Rowe, Govern·
mental Regulation of Societal Riska, 45 Gso. WASH. L. REv. 944 (1977); Note, COlt·
Benefit Analysis for Standards Regulating Toxic Substance, Under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA, 60 B.U.L. RBV. 115
(1980) [hereinafter cited 88 Note, Standards Regulating Toxic Subltancel.).
8. Note, Standards Regulating Toxic Subltances, supra note 7, at 140. See also
Baram, supra note 7, at 477·78.
9. Note, Standards Regulating Toxic Sub,tances, supra note 7, at 140. See generally materials cited note 7 supra.
10. See Baram, supra note 7, at 482·83 ("Cost· benefit analysis offers no protection
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be placed on them now and in the future, II and how values are
to be assigned to intangible costs and benefits which are not
readily identifiable,ll1 is a highly subjective task and vulnerable
to both honest mistakes and dishonest manipulation by the individual or group doing the analysis. 18 Seen in the practical perspective of trying to construct a cost-benefit analysis which reasonably will anticipate all prospective costs and benefits, the
analysis can be a "riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an
enigma. "14
The thesis of this Note is that the decision in American
Textile, read with the American Petroleum case, leaves no significant barriers impeding the Agency from achieving its primary goal of providing workers with the safest work environment possible. This Note will analyze the decision in American
Textile, and the future of cost-benefit analysis in its wake. Part
One outlines briefly the statutory framework of the Act and its
against historically bad assumptions. . . .") (quoting E. STOKEY & R. ZECHHAUSER, A
PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 148·49 (1978». For example, if cost·benefit analysis had
been mandated in American Textile, would the Agency be correct in including secondary
costs which could be avoided by the regulation of a toxic substance, such as welfare and
medical costs attributable to the illness contracted by the worker? These secondary costs
would include aid to families with dependent children, workers' compensation, medical
expenses, and costs of other social services. See Note, Standards Regulating Tozic Sub·
stances, supra note 7, at 141 n.14S.
11. To conduct a proper cost·benefit analysis, the future costs and the benefits of an
activity must be determined. This requires that future costs and benefits be "dis·
counted" to determine their present value. Baram, supra note 7, at 486·87. Problems in
discounting future values arise, not in the process to be used in discounting these costs,
but in the correct discount rate to be applied. Note, Standards Regulating Tozic Sub·
stances, supra note 7, at 141 n.143.
12. How can an Agency seriously put an accurate dollar amount on the price of a
life? Agencies have developed at least three ways of valuing lives: (1) placing a dollar
amount on the future earnings of a worker whose career is ended prematurely by death
or injury; (2) measuring the cost of the ways used to prevent a death when a person is ill
or in danger (e.g., how much will society spend to rescue coal miners trapped in a mine
after an accident); and (3) the salary differential between an activity with a normal dan·
ger level and one which is very hazardous (e.g., working on an oil drilling platform as
opposed to extinguishing an out·of·control fire on the same platform). These measures
still have their flaws. Note, Is Cost·Benefit Analysis Required?, supra note 7, at 437·40.
The public is unwilling to accept the concept that human life has a dollar value.
Wheeler, The Public's Costly Mistrust of Cost·Benefit Safety Analysis, Nat'l L.J., Oct.
13, 1980, at 26, col. 2. Commentators also recommend cautious use of cost· benefit analy·
sis when quantifying intangibles. See Baram, supra note 7, at 484.
13. Baram, supra note 7, at 487·90; Note, Standards Regulating Tozic Substances,
supra note 7, at 141.
14. J. BARTLETI', FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 743 (1Sth ed. Boston) (1st ed. Boston) (Win·
ston Churchill radio broadcast to England, October I, 1939).
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pertinent sections. Part Two describes the judicial interpretations of the Act. Finally, Part Three discusses the American
Textile decision and its implications.
II. THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
OF 1970

A.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT

Congress expressly passed the Act "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
. healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources . . . ."111 The Act in its inception covered an estimated
4.1 million places of business with 57 million employees. Ie
Section 652(8) defines the term "occupational safety and
health standard" as one "which requires conditions, or the adopIS. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970). When the Act was passed in 1970, 14,500 persons were
killed annually in work· related accidents. An additional 2.2 million workers were dis·
abled annually, resulting in a 1088 of 2SO million worker days. The accompanying 1088 to
economic productivity is equally staggering. It was estimated that over $1.5 billion in
wages were lost due to these injuries. The annual loss to the Gr088 National Product was
estimated at over $8 billion. SENATE SuaCOMM. ON LABOR OP SENATE COMM. ON LABOR
AND Puauc WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OP THB OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH
Ac:r OP 1970, 92d Cong., 1st Seas. 144, reprinted in (1971] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. NBws
5177 (hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
Toxic substances were singled out for special attention by Congress. The United
States Surgeon General, after conducting a study in metropolitan areas, found that 65%
of the workers in the study were potentially exposed to harmful physical agents (includ·
ing noise) or toxic material. In contrast, the study showed that a mere 25 percent of the
workers studied were adequately protected by standards limiting exposure to these
dangers.
To illustrate the magnitude of the problem and the extent to which it largely had
been ignored by the businesa and industrial communities, Congresa pointed to the cotton
industry and the effects of cotton dust on workers:
(D]espite repeated warnings over the years from other coun·
tries that their cotton workers suffered from lung disease, it is
only witt.:n the past decade that we have recognized byssinosis
among workers in American cotton mills. Recent studies now
show that this illness, caused by the dust generated in the
processing of cotton, and resulting in continuous IIhortnesa of
breath, chronic cough, and total disablement, affects Bubstan·
tial percentages of cotton textile workers. In Bome states as
many as 30% of those in the carding or spinning rooms have
been affected, and it has been estimated that 811 many as
100,000 active or retired workers currently suffer from thiB
disease.
Id.
16. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, at 144.
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tion or use of one or more practices, means, methods, operations
or processes, reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide safe
or healthy employment and places of employment."17
An important facet of the Act is the ability of the Secretary
of Labor (the Secretary), working through the Agency, to promulgate standards regulating worker exposure to toxic
substances. IS
The Act empowers the Agency to adopt occupational safety
and health standards by: (1) adopting any national consensus
standard or established Federal standard in force at the time the
Act was passedjll' (2) modifying, promulgating, or revoking any
occupational safety or health standard through informal "notice
and comment" rule-making proceduresjlo and (3), in the case of
extraordinary hazards to workers, by promulgating "emergency
temporary standards" to take effect immediately upon publication in the Federal Register. l1
17. 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976).
18. Id. § 652(8).
19. Id. § 655(A). This authority lasted for two years after the effective date of the
Act and provided immediate protection until permanent standards could be promulgated. The Act defines a "national consensus standard" as:
[AJny occupational safety and health standard or modification
thereof which (1) has been adopted and promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing organization under
procedures whereby it can be determined by the Secretary
that persons interested and atl'ected by the scope or provisions
of the standard have reached substantial agreement in its
adoption, (2) was formulated in a manner which atl'orded an
opportunity for diverse views to be considered, and (3) has
been designated as such a standard by the Secretary, after
consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies.
Id. § 652(9).
The term "established Federal standards" is defined as "any operative occupational
safety and health standard established by any agency of the United States and presently
in effect, or contained in any Act of Congress in force on December 29, 1970." Id. §
652(10). The Secretary can refuse to issue both national consensus standards and established federal standards under the Act, if it is determined that "the promulgation of
such raJ standard would not result in improved safety or health for specifically designated employees." Id. I 655(a).
20. Id. § 655(b). Although the Act specifically exempts the Agency from compliance
with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. I§ 551-559 (1970), the notice and comment rule-making procedure, when combined with the substantial evidence rule for judicial review of Agency standards, makes the procedures similar to the Hybrid procedures
of the Magnuson-Moss Act, tit. 2, Pub. L. No. 93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (codified at scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C. (1976».
21. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976). This section reads:
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When promulgating standards regulating toxic substances
under the Act, section 655(b)(5) mandates the Secretary to
set the standard which most adequately assures,
to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best
available evidence, that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity. . . . [I]n addition to the attainment of the
highest degree of health and safety protection for
the employee, other considerations shall be the
latest scientific data in the field, [and] the feasibility of the standards. . . ."

This statutory language, which lacks an explicit legislative
history, left the Courts to determine what feasibility means and
the extent to which it can or should affect the Agency's decision
on which and how toxic substances are to be regulated.
III. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION
655(b)(5) OF THE ACT
A.

THE CIRCUIT COURTS

The lower courts outlined the basic contours of both the judicial review of standards regulating toxic substances and the
meaning of feasibility under Section 655(b)(5) in two key cases:
Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgsonll and SociThe Secretary shall provide, without regard to the requirements of chapter 5 of Title 5, for an emergency temporary
standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the
Federal Register if he determines (a) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to substances or agents
determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from new
hazards, and (b) that such emergency standard is neceBB8J')' to
protect employees from such danger.
(2) Such standard shall be effective until superceded by a
standard promulgated in accordance with the procedures prescribed in paragraph (3) of this subsection.
(3) Upon publication of such a standard in the Federal Register, the Secretary shall commence a proceeding in accordance
with subsection (b) of this section, and the standard as published shall also serve as a proposed rule for the proceeding.
The Secretary shall promulgate a standard under this paragraph no later than sa months after publication of the emergency standard as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection.
22. Id. § 655(b)(5) (emphasis added).
23. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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ety of Plastics Industry v. OSHA."f
In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, the
AFL~CIO challenged the Agency's issuance of permanent standards regulating worker exposure to asbestosl l on the grounds
that the Act does not permit the Agency to employ an economic
analysis when promulgating standards for exposure to toxic substances."e The court rejected the union's contention.'" A unanimous court interpreted the "to the extent feasible" language of
section 655(b)(5) to mean that "a standard that is prohibitively
expensive is not feasible."16 The court further found that the
Act requires the Agency to consider the economic impact of proposed standards, including the technological feasibilities of
achieving the requirements of the proposed standard, and reasoned that "Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees by putting their employees out of business-either by requiring protective devices unavailable under
existing technology or by making financial viability generally
impossible. ""11
The court limited the use of economic feasibility as a re~
striction on the promulgation of standards for toxic substances,
however, stating in dictum that "[s]tandards may be economi~
cally feasible even though, from the standpoint of employers,
24. 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
25. The union relied on 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976). Prior to the iBSuance of permanent standards, the Agency had exercised its powers under § 655(c) to iBBue temporary
emergency standards. 499 F.2d at 471. Section 655(c) appears at note 21 supro.
"Asbestos is a generic term applicable to a number of fibrous, inorganic, silicate
minerals that are incombustible in air." 499 F.2d at 471. An estimated three to five million workers are exposed annually to asbestos in the building trades and shipyard industries. Id. The inhalation of asbestos dust causes asbestosis (severe lung scarring) and
manufacturing and construction workers exposed to the dust suffer from disproportionately higher rates of pulmonary cancer. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supro note 15, at 145.
26. 499 F.2d at 476.
27. [d. at 477.
28. [d.
29. [d. In support of this proposition, the court quoted Senator Javits, author of the
amendment adding the feasibility language to the Act:
As a result of this amendment, the Secretary, in setting standards, is expreBSly required to consider the feasibility of proposed standards. This was an improvement over the Daniels
bill, which might be interpreted to require absolute health and
safety in all cases, regardleBS of feasibility, and the Administration bill, which contains no criteria for standards at all.
[d.
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they are financially burdensome and affect profit margins. . . .
[T]he concept of economic feasibility [does not] guarantee the
continued existence of individual employers. uao The court indicated that if the proposed standards, for some industries, imposed undue hardship on an industry as a whole, then the
Agency should consider that factor in determining feasibility.al
In reviewing the asbestos standard, the court showed considerable deference to the decisions made by the Secretary and
the Agency on how best to regulate worker exposure to the toxin
based upon both the complex scientific nature of the Agency's
regulatory task and the quasi-legislative powers conferred on the
Agency and the Secretary.
[Slome of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as to them
insufficient data is presently available to make a
fully informed determination. Decision-making
must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judgments and less upon purely
factual analysis.... Judicial review of inherently
legislative decisions of this sort is obviously an
undertaking of different dimensions.1I

While Industrial Union Department dealt primarily with
economic feasibility under section 655(b)(5), the decision in Society of Plastics Industry v. OSHA scrutinized the meaning of
technological feasibility." In Society of Plastics, manufacturers
and users of vinyl chloride challenged the Agency's standards
governing exp9sure, U contending that the standard was neither
technologically nor economically feasible. 81
30. Id. at 478.
31.Id.
32. Id. at 474-75. The court noted that the review of Agency determinations in this
case was basically a review of fundamental policy, rather than a traditional case in controversy. Id.
33. For a detailed explanation of these cases, see Berger & Ruskin, Economic and
Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Sublltances under the Occupational and
Safety Health Act, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 285 (1978).
34. Vinyl chloride is the gaseous raw material used in the manufacture of plastics.
The standard governing vinyl chloride appears at 29 C.F.R § 1910.1017 (1981). See generally Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and
Policy of Toxic Substance Control, 7 EcOLOGY L.Q. 497, 522 (1978).
35. 509 F.2d at 1308. As in the regulation of asbestos, the Agency in 1974 promulgated a temporary emergency standard regulating exposure levels of vinyl chloride. See
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The Second Circuit upheld the Agency's vinyl chloride standard and said "the ultimate facts [the possible dangers to workers] are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge.... [Under the
Act] it remains the duty of the Secretary to act to protect the
working man, and to act even in circumstances where existing
methodology or research is deficient. "a8 The court further stated
that the Secretary "may raise questions [or issue new standards]
which require the development of new technology, and he is not
limited to issuing standards based solely upon devices already
fully developed."87

B.

Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:

In Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Institute, the Supreme Court for the first time dealt
with the issue of feasibility under the Act. In American Petroleum, the court considered the Agency's standard for worker exposure to benzene. as The primary danger from exposure to bennote 25 supra and accompanying text. The challenged standard reduced allowable exposure to workers from the temporary emergency standard of 50 ppm. to a new permanent
standard of 1 ppm.
36. 509 F.2d at 1308 (quoting Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499
F.2d at 474.) Dismissing the industry's argument, the court upbraided the plaintiffs for
their lack of belief in technology, stating, "it appears that (the industry] simply needs
more faith in their own technological potentialities.... n 509 F.2d at 1309.
37. 509 F.2d at 1309. The Second Circuit summarily disposed of the economic feasibility issue by noting, "if the petitioners find that they cannot comply for reasons beyond
their control, OSHA permits the amendment of standards." 1d. at 1310. For support, the
court cited the temporary variance provision of the Act, § 655(b)(6)(A), which reads in
pertinent part:
Any employer may apply to the Secretary for a temporary order granting variance from a standard or any provision thereof
promulgated under this section. Such temporary order shall be
granted only if the employer files an application which meets
the requirements of clause (B) and establishes that (i) he is
unable to comply with a standard by its effective date because
of unavailability of profeBBional or technical personnel or of
materials and equipment needed to come into compliance with
the standard or because neceBBarY construction or alteration of
facilities cannot be completed by the effective date, (ii) he is
taking all available steps to safeguard his employees against
the hazards covered by the standard, and (iii) he has an effective program for coming into compliance with the standard as
quickly as practicable.
38. Benzene is a toxic substance that is colorleBB, aromatic, and evaporates quickly
under atmospheric exposure. Its principal uses are as an ingredient in the manufacture
of fuels for internal combustion engines, solvents, detergents, and pesticides. 509 F.d at

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 5

458

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:449

zene is in the inhalation of fumes. 88 Exposure to high
concentrations of the chemical can have an immediate deadly
effect on humans,4o and long-term exposure to lower concentrations produces a slow death.41
Prior to the Act, a national consensus standard governed exposure to benzene,4I limiting exposure to "10 ppm averaged over
an 8-hour period with a ceiling concentration of 25 ppm for 10minute periods or a maximum peak concentration of 30 ppm.""
In 1971, the Agency adopted this national consensus standard
pursuant to section 655(a) of the Act as an established federal
standard. 44
In 1977, the Agency issued its permanent standard which
lowered the permissible exposure level to 1 ppm. 411 The Supreme
Court, however, characte1'ized the Agency's administrative record supporting the 10 ppm level of exposure as "sketchy at
best."4s Furthermore, the Agency made no findings on how a reduction of exposure from 10 ppm to 1 ppm would significantly
reduce the risk, and, in fact, no studies had been conducted
showing the correlation between exposure to 10 ppm or less of
benzene.47
Justice Stevens, writing the plurality opinion, rejected the
arguments of all parties involved4s and held that sections
1309. (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 5,91S (1978». Over one million workers are exposed annually
to low-level concentrations of the substance. 448 U.S. at 615-16.
39. 448 U.S. at 616. Once inhaled, the chemical is absorbed by the blood and diffused throughout the body.
40. rd. at 617. Exposure to concentrations of 20,000 ppm have an immediate effect
on the central nervoua system. rd. Intermediate levels of exposure, from 500 to 250 ppm,
cause mild symptoms of poisoning, nauaea, and vertigo. rd. (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 5,921
(1978».
41. 448 U.S. at 617.
42. rd. The full text of this standard may be found at 43 Fed. Reg. 5,919 (1978).
43. 448 U.S. at 617.
44. rd.
45. ld. at 624-26 (quoting 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 (1978». In the intervening period between the adoption of the national consensua standard in 1971 and the permanent standard in 1977, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (1979), the Agency attempted to promulgate emergency temporary standards, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977), which were substantially the
same 88 the eventual permanent standards. 448 U.S. at 623. The Fifth Circuit issued a

temporary restraining order preventing the standard from taking effect. ld.
46.448 U.S. at 631.
47. ld. at 632-38.
48. rd. at 639. The Agency argued that § 652(8) had "no legal significance or at best
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655(b)(5) and 652(8) of the Act must be read together when
pro~ulgating any permanent standard and required "the Secretary ... to determine that it [the standard] is reasonably necessary and appropriate to remedy a significant risk of material
health impairment. "49 The Justice found support for his position
in section 655(g)~O and 655(b)(8).~1
Justice Stevens wrote that section 655(g) requires that:
"[I)n determining the priority for establishing
standards under this section, the Secretary shall
give due regard to the urgency of the need for
mandatory safety and health standards for particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations, businesses, workplaces or work environments" ....
[I)f such an analysis must precede the promulgation of any standard, it seems manifest that Congress intended, at a bare minimum, that the
Secretary find a significant risk of harm and
therefore a probability of significant benefits
before establishing a new standard:·1

The second section, 655(b)(8), requires that when an existing consensus standard is substantially altered, "the Secretary
[shall] publish ... a statement of reasons why the rule ... will
better effectuate the purposes [of the Act.]"~8 The plurality
stated that "[i]f this requirement was intended to be more than
a meaningless formality, it must be read to impose upon the
Secretary the duty to find that an existing national consensus
merely requires that a standard not be totally vocational." [d. The industry argued that,
reading §§ 655(b)(5) and 652(8) together would require the Agency to "quantify both the
costs and the benefits of a proposed rule and to conclude that they are roughly commen·
surate." [d.
49. [d. at 639 (emphasis added).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1976) reads as follows:
In determining the priority for establishing standards under
this section, the Secretary shall give due regard to the urgency
of the need for mandatory safety and health standards for
particular industries, trades, crafts, occupations, businesses,
workplaces, or work environments. The Secretary shall also
give due regard to the recommendations of the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare regarding the need for
mandatory standards in determining the priority for establish·
ing such standards.
51. [d. § 655(b)(8). 448 U.S. at 643·44 (Stevens, J.).
52. 448 U.S. at 643·44.
53. [d.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 5

460

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:449

standard is not adequate to protect workers from a cohtinuing
and significant risk of harm."a. Justice Stevens stated that an
alternative interpretation of the Act, giving the Secretary broad
power to determine what risks are significant, might constitute a
breach of the non-delegation doctrinel l prohibiting the delegation of legislative powers to agencies as outlined in Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States" and Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan. I '
The Court also found support in the legislative history of
the Act, which showed Congress "was concerned, not with absolute safety, but with the elimination of significant harm."118
However, the Court also stated that the threshold of significant risk would not be a great barrier to regulating toxic substances, that the requirement is "not a mathematical strait jacket,"11 and that the Agency is not required to quantify risks "with
anything approaching scientific certainty.'180
Because the Court did not determine that a finding of significant risk of harm was made before the benzene standard was
promulgated, it was unnecessary to address the question of
whether the cost of regulation was reasonable in relation to its
benefits.1I1
54.ld.
55. ld. at 646.
56. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
57. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
58. 448 U.S. at 646 (quoting LBGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 15, at 345) ("What
are we going to do about a place in Florida whose mosquitos are getting at the employee
. . . . Are we going to say that if employees get bitten by thoee for the rest of their lives
they will not have been done any harm at all?") I&GI8LATIVE HISTORY. supra note 15, at
245 (remarks of Sen. Dominick).
59. 448 U.S. at 655.
60. ld. at 656. As examples of the assessment involved in Identifying a significant
risk, the Court stated that the chances of a person contracting cancer from a drink of
chlorinated water would be insignificant, id., but, odds of one in one thousand that the
prolonged inhalation of gasoline vapors containing benzene would cause cancer, might be
a significanct risk. 1d. at 655.
To support a finding of significant risk it need only be IIUpported by "a body of
reputable scientific thought." ld. at 656. This view of review ot Agency activities Is expressed in Industrial Union Dep't AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d at 474-75, and Society
of Plastics v. OSHA, 509 F.2d at 1304. See discussion at notes lli·29 supra and accompa·
nying text.
61. 448 U.S. at 650.
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Justice Powell, while concurring in the judgment, believed
the Court should have decided the cost-benefit question." Justice Powell would require that the cost of regulation bear some
reasonable relationship to its projected benefits," and argued
that Congress did not intend these regulations to ignore economic considerations and cause economic injury to the industries affected by these standards."
The plurality opinion in American Petroleum has been both
praised and criticized. In praising the opinion, attention focused
on the use of cost-benefit analysis as a restraint on the intrusion
of the government on private enterprise.e• In criticizing the
opinion, commentators found the opinion encouraging judicial
anarchy in the area of administrative law," undercutting the
rule-making authority of OSHA,e7 misapprehending the legislative intent of the Act,e. and contributing to regulatory
confusion. 8e
Speculation over the meaning of American Petroleum was
quickly ended by the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan.
IV. THE AMERICAN TEXTILE DECISION
In American Textile Manufacturers v. Donovan, the cotton
industry challenged a standard limiting worker exposure to cot62. Id. at 664.
63. ld. at 667. "It is simply unreasonable to believe that Congress intended OSHA
to pursue the desirable goal of risk-free workplace to the extent that the economic viability of particular industries-or significant segments thereof-is threatened." Id. at 669.
64. Id. at 671. Justice Rehnquist would strike down the Act as an unconstitutional
delegation under Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 288 (1935). See note 55 supra.
65. Note, OSHA after American Petroleum Institute: A Proposed Regulatory
Budget, 33 STAN. L. REv. 917 (1981) (arguing that the Congress should impose a regulatory budget on OSHA regulations, serving as a ceiling on coats of compliance).
66. Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision Theory in
Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 ENVTL. LAw 301 (1980) (attacking the Benzene
decision as allowing too much judicial review of Agency decision-making).
67. Note, OSHA's Rulemaking Authority Under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act: Marshall v. American Petroleum Institute, 12 Loy. L. REv. 229 (1981).
68. Note, Occupational Health and Safety-the Benzene Case: Life, Liberty and
the Pursuit of Health-Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Institute, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 311 (1980).
69. Sullivan, The Benzene Decision: A Contribution to Regulatory Confusion, 33
AD. L. REV. 351 (1981).
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ton dust.'o
On June 28, 1978, the Secretary issued final standards limiting exposure to cotton dust over an eight hour period to 200 mgt
mS for yarn manufacturing, 750 mg/m8 for slashing and weaving
operations, and 500 mg/m8 for the other processes in the manufacture of cotton. 71 In enacting the standard, the Agency believed itself obligated to adopt "the most stringent standard to
protect against material health impairment, bounded only by
technological and economic feasibility.'''·
The cotton industry attacked the standards primarily on
two grounds. The first relied on Justice Powell's in American
Petroleum that the cost of the regulation did not bear a reasonable relation to its benefit and that the Secretary failed to show
the regulation "addresses a significant risk of material health
impairment."" The other attacked the Secretary's determination that the standards were economically feasible as not supported by substantial evidence.'·

A.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, put to rest the
debate as to whether cost-benefit analysis was required for
70. 101 S. Ct. at 2481-83, "Cotton dust" is an airborne particulate by-product of the
preparation and manufacture of cotton products, exposure to which produces a condition
known as byssinosis. 1d. at 2482. Byssinosis was one of the diseases expressly mentioned
by Congress when it passed the Occupational Safety and Health Act. LBGlSLATJVB HISTORY, supra note IS, at 143. Byssinosis, also known as "brown lung," is a continuum
disease marked by five progressive stages. 101 S. Ct. at 2484. Descriptions of the physical
symptoms or byssinosis may be found in id. at n.9.
71. 101 S. Ct. at 2486-87. The record compiled on cotton dust is amazing. It consists
of exhibits, transcripts of oral and written testimony, post-hearing comments, and briefa
totalling more than 105,000 pages. 1d. The atatement of findings and reasons supporting
the cotton dust standard runs 69 pages and appears at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043 (1980).
72. 101 S. Ct. at 2487.
73. 1d. at 2489.
74. 1d. at 2497. Agency standards provided that both engineering controls and respirators be used to meet the exposure standards for cotton dust. 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1043(E)(I)-(3)(O (1980). In addition, the standards required that employers provide
employees unable to wear respirators an opportunity to transfer to another position, if
available, with no 1088 of earnings, employment rilhta or benefits. 1d. §
1910.1043(F)(2)(v) (1980). The industry challenged this portion of the standard on the
ground that the Agency lacked authority to promulgate such a standard. 101 S. Ct. at
2504. The Court, deferring any ruling on the merits, remanded the question to the circuit
court to determine whether this guarantee is related to the achievement of a safe and
healthful work environment. 1d. at 2505-06.
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OSHA regulations.
Any standard based on a balancing of costs and
benefits by the Secretary that strikes a different
balance than that struck by Congress would be
inconsistent with the command set forth in Section [655(b)(5)]. Thus, cost-benefit analysis by
OSHA is not required by the statute because feasibility analysis is. '7&

The Court looked to the "plain meaning of the word feasible, '>78
a comparison with other federal laws requiring cost-benefit analysis," and the legislative history of the Act," in reaching its
decision.
Analyzing the specific language of section 655(b)(5), the
Court found that "Congress uses specific language when intending that an agency engage in cost benefit analysis. . . .
[C]ertainly in the light of its ordinary meaning, the word feasible cannot be construed to articulate such congressional
intent. "78
The Court then found that reading sections 655(b)(5) and
652(8) together does not mandate a cost-benefit analysis, but
merely requires that "standards [relating to toxic materials and
harmful substances] be issued to prevent material impairment of
health to the extent feasible. ''80 In section 655(b)(5) the Court
noted a conspicuous absence of any indication that Congress im75. 101 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court stated that if cost·benefit analysis could be ap·
plied to any decision made by the Agency it may be used in choosing alternative meth·
ods of regulating exposure to toxic substances. [d. at n.29.
76. [d. at 2490 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 831 (1976), THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 116 (1933) and FUNK &
W AGNALL'S NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 903 (1957)).
77. 101 S. Ct. at 2491. As examples of congressional language requiring either cost·
benefit or feasibility analysis, the court cited pertinent sections from a variety of acts.
See, e.g., the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1971,15 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1976 & Supp. II
1978); the Flood Control Act of 1936, 33 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976); Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312(b)(1)(2), 1314 (b)(l)(B) (Supp. II
1978); the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6295 (c)(d) (1976 &
Supp. II 1978) and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(B)
(Supp. II 1978).
78. 101 S. Ct. at 2493·97.
79. [d. at 2491 (emphasis added).
80. [d. at 2492 (emphasis in the original). The Court noted that ~he industry's argu·
ment that § 652(b) imposes an overriding requirement of cost· benefit analysis to
§ 655(b)(5) would be contrary to Congress' intent. [d.
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posed a cost-benefit requirement on standards promulgated
under section 655(b)(5).81
The Court argued that while the legislative history showed
that Congress did not intend to impose the chimerical goal of a
risk-free workplace,1I it did intend that "the Act would create
substantial costs for employers . . . when necessary to create a
safe and healthful working environment. "88
The industry claimed that the Secretary's economic feasibility estimates for the cost of complying with the cotton dust standard were not supported by substantial evidence as required in
section 655(f) of the Act. Specifically, they charged that: "(1)
. . . OSHA had underestimated the financial cost necessary to
meet the standard's requirement and (2) that OSHA incorrectly
found that the' Standard would not threaten the economic viability of the cotton industry."" In reviewing the Agency findings, the Court said it would reverse only if the circuit court
"misapprehended or gravely misapplied" the standard.8&
The Agency, in constructing a cost estimate for industry
compliance with the standard, had the benefit of two analyses-one commissioned by the Agency and the other by the industry. Both estimates were severely flawed and the Agency totally rejected its own study." However, the Agency did adopt
81. 101 S. Ct. at 2493.
82. For this proposition the Court cited the statements of Senatora Javits in LEGIS'
LATIVE HISTORY, .upro note 15, at 197 and Dominick, id. at 480·482, 502.
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2496. The Court quoted Senator Yarborough's statement concern·
ing the costs of compliance:
One may well ask too expensive for whom? Is it too expensive
for the company who for lack of proper safety equipment loses
the services of its akilled employees? la it too expenlive for the
employee who loses his hand or leg or eyesight? ... We are
talking about people's liveB, not the indi1rerence of some cost
accountants.
Id. (quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, .upro note 15, at 510).
84. 101 S. Ct. at 2497.
85. Id. (quoting Univeraal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951».
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2497·99. The Agency commissioned Research Training Institute
(RTI) and the Industry commissioned Hocutt·Thomas (H·T). RTI's estimated cost of
compliance of $1.1 billion for engineering controls was rejected for three reasons: (1) the
estimate was based on the false assumption that the controls would be applied to all
equipment in the cotton mills (equipment processing synthetic fibera are exempted); (2)
the study did not take into account the fact that lOme portions of industry were at or
near compliance with the new standard; and, (3) the study did not use accurate data on
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the industry-commissioned study, discounted by thirty percent,
to determine the industry's compliance costs.'" The Court held
that because of the unavailability of more reliable information
and because the Act requires only that standards be promulgated on the basis of the best available evidence, "the Agency
acted reasonably in adopting the [industry] estimate.""
The Court found no problem in concluding that the industry could bear the cost of complying with the standards promulgated by the Agency. The Agency concluded, based on its own
discredited study, that, with minor dislocations on a firm-byfirm basis, the industry could absorb the cost of the
regulations."
The Court also held that the substantial evidence test was
not misapprehended or applied in the lower court."
B. THE DISSENTS

In dissent, Justice Stewart found that the Agency's finding
of the feasibility evidence was merely "unsupported speculation."'l Justice Stewart would require OSHA to conduct a costbenefit analysis to determine the economic feasibility of the
Agency's proposed standards.'1 Unlike the majority, this dissent
found the Agency's reliance on cost projections derived from the
discredited studies to be insufficient to support a finding that
the standard was economically feasible, based on substantial
evidence."
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, repeated
the industry. rd. at 2498.
The H-T study W8B similarly flawed. It put industry compliance coats for engineering controls at $543 million. The Agency found this estimate overstated for four re8BOnB:
(I) some mills had complied with the standards already; (2) the study failed to take into
account an industry trend toward the replacement of older machinery; (3) the study
failed to take into account new technologies; and (4) the study included controls covering
synthetic machines not covered by the standard. rd. at 2498-99.
87. ld. at 2499.
88. ld. at 2500.
89. rd. at 2501-04.
90. rd. at 2504.
91. rd. at 2507.
92. ld. Justice Stewart's opinion makes no mention of how he would formulate the
cost-benefit analysis.
93.ld.
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the essence of his concurring in the judgement opinion in American Petroleum,'· by invoking the non-delegation doctrine. Justice Rehnquist would find the Act unconstitutional because
"Congress failed to choose aDlong those plausible interpretations."'11 This failure, he argues, amounts to an abdication of the
Congress' responsibility to make legislative decisions."
C.

ANALYSIS

The Court's decision in American Textile prohibiting the
use of cost-benefit analysis by the Agency is a sound and reasonable interpretation of the Act. Justice Brennan's use of the ordinary and natural meaning of the word feasible together with a
comparison with health environment-related statutes convincingly shows that Congress uses at least two separate methods of
curtailing agency discretion in decision-making."
These distinct patterns of legislation are evident, for example, in the Surface Mining and Central Reclamation Act of
1977'8 and Outer Continental Shelf Act Amendments of 1978."
The Surface Mining Act requires that miners protect non-mineral resources and values "to the extent possible, using the best
technology currently available. "100 The Outer Continental Shelf
Amendments illustrate the cost-benefit approach. These Amendments prohibit the Secretary of the Interior from regulating offshore drilling operations where "the incremental benefits [to
health, safety, and the environment] are clearly insufficient to
justify the incremental cost of using such technologies. "101 This
clear duality in legislative intent is evident in several regulatory
statutes. lOll The Court's conclusion that "where cost-benefit
analysis is intended, Congress clearly indicated it on the face of
the statute,"108 is decidedly supported by the duality in legislative intent and the purposeful inclusion of feasibility language
by Congress.
94. Id. at 2507. See 448 U.S. at 671.
95. 101 S.Ct. at 2510 set forth in the margin at •.
96. Id. at 2508-09.
97. See notes 59 and 60 supra and accompanying text.
98. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (Supp. II 1978).
99. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (Supp. II 1978).
100. 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b) (Supp. II 1978).
101. 43 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (Supp. II 1978).
102. See, e.g., Statutes cited in note 77, supra.
103. 101 S. Ct. at 2491. See notes 77, 96-99, supra and 8$:companying text.
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The legislative history of the Act, although replete with concern that the Act not mandate a risk-free workplace, viewed
worker health as paramount.IO<C Imposing a cost-benefit analysis
on the Act would condition worker protection on the economic
cost of such measures, and rearrange the priorities set by
Congress. 106
Furthermore, the decision in American Textile precludes
the application of President Reagan's Executive Order requiring
that all major regulatory proposals of agencies be subjected to
strict cost-benefit analysis"" The decision has wider implications: the Court has apparently ruled that all regulatory statutes
which employ the economic feasibility standard may be barred
from complying with the order"0'7 Viewed in separation of power
terms, the decision prevents the executive from circumventing
Congress through the use of executive orders.108
Justice Stewart's dissent, unlike the majority, would rearrange the priorities set by the Act based upon the dictates of
cost-benefit analysis. The non-delegation doctrine reasoning advanced by Justice Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice Burger
is outmoded by political and legislative realities, except in ex104. "The Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy ... to assure so far as
possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human resources...." 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note IS, at 1150-51 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton); id. at 444, 510
(remarks of Sen. Yarborough); id. at 1029·33. (remarks of Congressman Dent) id. at 502
(remarks of Sen. Dominick); id. at 502·03 (remarks of Sen. Williams).
105. See notes 7-14 supra and accompanying text.
106. See Executive Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981). This interpretation
of the effect of American Textile is supported by an analysis of Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Youngstown set out three situations where the
President's power is challenged and the legal consequences of each. In the third category,
the President's power is at its lowest: "Where the President takes measures incompatible
with the express or implied will of Congress." [d. at 637. In this situation, the President
may "rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter." [d. American Textile falls into this third area of analysis.
The Court in American Textile ruled that Congress mandated a feasibility rather than a
cost-benefit analysis when OSHA issues standards governing exposure to toxins. Thus,
the President's power to require a cost· benefit study is nil.
I! the President's executive order were given legal effect after American Textile, the
President would be granted legislative power unconstitutionally. This may be the reason
that the Court rejected the Administration's motion, after President Reagan's inauguration, to vacate the court of appeals judgment and allow the Agency to reopen the record
on cotton dust. See 101 S. Ct. at 2488 n.25.
107. See Note, 95 HARV. L. REV. 319, 326 (1981).
108. [d.
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treme situations. lOtI

D.

IMPLICATIONS

It is clear that, absent a change in the composition of the
Court or the language of the statute, the Supreme Court will not
infuse a cost-benefit analysis into the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970. 110 However, even after American Petroleum
and American Textile, many unanswered qustions remain. The
Agency answered the question of how standards will be formulated when it determined to replace the old evaluation systeml11
with a new four-step formula. The new system is based on: (1) a
determination of significant risk of worker health impairments;
(2) the potential for risk reduction; (3) an analysis of the economic feasibility of the standard; and (4) a cost-effectiveness
evaluation of the most efficient way to achieve protection. 1lI

The most important and scientifically difficult part of this
analysis is the determination of what constitutes a significant
risk of harm to workers, hence, worthy of regulation. This question was left unanswered by American Petroleuml l l and was not
an issue in American Textile. lu
At present, scientific knowledge about toxic and carcinogenic substances is poor. I I I Scientific knowledge about the cause
109. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
110. The retirement from the Court of Justice Stewart, and his subsequent replacement by Justice O'Connor, will not affect the Court's position on the Act and cost-benefit analysis because the change does not affect the majority in American Textile.
111. Under the old evaluation system, OSHA used a three-step proce88 under which
the Agency (1) determined if exposure to a substance posed a significant risk of material
health impairment to the worker; (2) evaluated the potential for risk reduction by regulation; and (3) analyzed the costs and benefits of alternative methods of regulations.
[Current reports) 10 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1425 (1981).
112. (Current reports) 11 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 131 (1981).
113. While the plurality in American Petroleum discU88ed methods of establishing
significant risk, the Court never explicitly stated how the Agency could meet ita burden.
448 U.S. at 655-58; Note, The Supreme Court's New Occupational Health Standard for
Benzene Exposure: Regulated Industry's Triumph oller Employee Health, 3 UTAH L.
REV. 525, 548-49 (1981).
114. 101 S. Ct. at 2488 n.25; 43 Fed. Reg. at 27,350 (1978).
115. Berger & Ruskin, supra note 33, at 286-87; McGarrity, Substantille and Procedural Discretion in Administratille Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating
Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GBO. L.J. 729, 733-36 (1979). See generally, Amicus
Curiae Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-
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and effects of industrial diseases and cancer is especially lacking
in three broad areas: (1) how toxic substances cause disease on
the cellular level;118 (2) the limitations of human and animal research in identifying acceptable levels of human exposure;117 and
(3) the statistical difficulties of translating animal reactions into
chemicals. ll8 Faced with these scientific problems, some commentators suggested that it would be impossible for OSHA to
CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (available immediately on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file). OSHA's Proposed Rule on the Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Toxic Substances Posing a Potential Carcinogenic Risk was
the focus of the plurality in American Petroleum. 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1980). The so-called
cancer policy adopted by OSHA was subsequently amended to comport with the decision
in American Petroleum. 46 Fed. Reg. 4,889 (1981).
116. There are essentially two theories about how carcinogens cause cancer in individual human cells: the "multiple" strike theory, and the "single" strike theory. Under
the "multiple" strike theory, a cell requires several exposures to one or more carcinogenic substances to become cancerous. Until the point at which cancer becomes carcinogenic, it is theorized, the cell repairs itself or certain defenses are mobilized to neutralize
the carcinogenic substances introduced into the cell. In the "single" strike theory, there
is no repair or defense by the cell; exposure to the smallest amount of a carcinogen produces uncontrolled cancer. See Doniger, supra note 34, at 510, 511.
117. Human experiments (epidemiological studies) are the most useful way of determining if a substance is toxic and what level of exposure humans can safely tolerate.
There are three principal limitations on the usefulness of these studies: (1) the ethical
problems which accompany attempts to expose humans to fatal substances; (2) the latency period between exposure to a harmful substance and the development of a disease,
usually 15-40 years; and (3) the limited reliability of any human experimentation because of exposure to other toxic substances in the environment, making it difficult to
show a causal connection between a given exposure and the accompanying disease. rd. at
511-12. Because certain animals (e.g., rats) have response characteristics similar to those
of humans, and because of their shorter life spans, controlled environment, and the lack
of ethical problems, animals are suitable for experimentation. rd. at 512. However, animals have a limited usefulness. Scientists can determine the cancer-causing potential of
substances (carcinogenicity), but, these animal tests do not yield risk assessments. rd. at
513.
118. Unless huge experiments involving literally millions of animals (so-called
"Mega-Mouse" experiments) are conducted, mathematical extrapolations must be used
to translate test results into models showing the correlation between low levels of exposure to a toxic substance and the expected incidence of cancer (dose-response curves).
Problems occur with these extrapolations because the mathematical models differ widely
in the construction of dose-response curves, sometimes by as much as a factor of 100,000.
rd. at 513.
It is also difficult to translate dose-response data across species lines from animals to
humans. For example, the National Academy of Sciences conducted a study to predict
the incidence of cancer from the effect of drinking one can of diet soda per day. "The
results suggested that in each 50 million people there could be as few as 0.0007 cancers
per year or as many as 3640. This is a range of error more than 5,OOO,OOO-fold." Amicus
Curiae Brief for Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Industrial Union Dep't, AFLCIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (available immediately on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
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meet Justice Steven's "significant risk" threshold. ll9 A close
reading of Justice Steven's opinion in American Petroleum,
however, suggests the opposite conclusion. In dictum, Justice
Stevens stated not only that "the requirement that a significant
risk is not a mathematical strait jacket"tlO but that "[the
Agency] is not required to support its finding that a significant
risk exists with anything approaching scientific certainty."llU In
a footnote, the plurality noted that both human and animal
studies provide an adequate basis upon which to base a decision
to regulate toxic substances. till Justice Stevens concludes his
analysis of how the Agency might prove "significant risk" by
stating that "so long as they are supported by a body of reputable scientific though, the Agency is free to use conservative assumptions in interpreting data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on. the side of over-protection rather than
underprotection."1lI8 The American Petroleum plurality, in what
may be its most telling statement, recognized that "[OSHA's]
determination ... [of] a particular level of risk will be based on
policy considerations."tI. The Court expressly left open the
question as to what type of judicial review would be applied to
those decisions.1lIII Clearly, the reason the Court struck down the
119. See, Note, supra note 67, at 253·54; Note, Industry's Triumph, supra note 113,
at 555; Note, supra note 68, at 345·46. Contra, Comment, The Significant Risk Require·
ments in OSHA Regulation of Carcinogens: Industrial Union Department, AFL·CIO v.
American Petroleum Institute, 33 STAN. L. Rsv. 551, 566 (1981).
120. 448 U.S. at 655.
121. Id. at 656. See also note 60 supra.
122. 448 U.S. at 657 n.64.
123. Id. at 656.
124. Id. at 655·5.6 n.62.
125. Although standards promulgated under the Act are to be reviewed under the
substantial evidence test, 29 U.S.C. § 655(g) (1976), the Judiciary has developed methods
to require the Agency to provide somewhat more than is required under the substantial
evidence test to support its findings. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). In areas where scientific knowledge is sparse or in areas
involving highly technical matters, the introduction of a subjectively higher standard of
review may hinder or even preclude the regulatory goals of Congress. For example, the
implied rejection in American Petroleum of the "single strike" theory of cancer causa·
tion in humans may result in the deaths of workers from expoaure to toxic substances
which would have been preventable using the "single strike" theory as a basis for regula·
tion. For a discussion of the "single strike" theory see note 116, supra. See generally
Leventhal, Enllironmental Decisionmaking and the Rule of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 509 (1974); Stewart, The Dellelopment of Administratille and Quasi·Constitutional
Law in Judicial Relliew of Enllironmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air
Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 714 (1977).
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benzene standard was that a rigid carcinogen policy was employed by the Agency, not because projections could not be constructed showing a reduced level of risk at exposures below 10
ppm. illS
In American Textile the Court accepted the lower court's
interpretation of the Act on the issue of economic feasibility.1I7
That view permits OSHA to choose methods of achieving its exposure levels that will, if necessary, impose such substantial
costs on industry that some employers might be forced out of
the market-place. 128 Although the Court was silent on the issue,
the point of economic infeasibility may be reached when the
competitive balance of an entire industry is destabilized II. or
where the industry becomes non-competitive with foreign competitors in domestic markets. ISO The Agency's ability to impose
substantial costs on an industry to achieve its exposure levels
must be distinguished from OSHA's ability to mandate that the
most costly methods be used to reach its goals. By implication,
the Court, in American Textile, directed the Agency to choose
the most cost-effective method of achieving its goals. 1I1 Should
OSHA, for example, choose the most expensive method of protecting workers from toxic substances when a less expensive
method would assure the same level of protection, the decision
probably would not meet the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" test of section 652(8).181 So long as OSHA's cost-effective126. "In light of the fact that there are literally thousands of substances used in the
workplace that have been identified as carcinogens or suspect carcinogens, the government's theory would give OSHA power to impose enormous costs that might produce
little, if any, discernible benefit." 448 U.S. at 645 (refuting the government's argument
that §§ 652(8) and 655(b)(5) merely required "OSHA to issue standards that are reasonably calculated to produce a safer or more healthy work environment.").
127. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-C/O v. Hodgson and Society ot Plastics Industry
v. OSHA are discussed at notes 23·37 and accompanying text, supra.
128. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra; Ct. 101 S. Ct. at 2495-97.
129. See Note, 95 HARv. L. REv. 319, 325 (1981) (arguing that OSHA could determine if the competitive balance of an industry is disrupted by using an anti-trust analysis). Cf, 101 S. Ct. at 2496 n.38.
130. There is no reason to assume that a loss of competitive advantage to foreign
competitors would preclude a finding of economic infeasibility.
131. 101 S. Ct. at 2493 n.32. Cost-benefit analYSis must be distinguished from costeffectiveness. "Cost-benefit analysis ... is used by the decision-maker to establish societal goals as well as the means for achieving these goals, whereas cost-effectiveness analysis only compares alternative means for achieving given goals." Baram, supra note 7, at
474.
132. A choice of controls to regulate explosure would not be "reasonably necessary"
if another method would provide the same level of protection.
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ness analysis is not used as a "Trojan horse" for cost-benefit
analysis, however, and worker protection is not sacrificed, costeffectiveness analysis is a useful device.
James D. Fisher
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